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We model a market with environmentally conscious consumers and a duopoly 
in which firms consider the adoption of a clean technology. We show that as 
pollution  increases,  consumers  shift  more  resources  to  the  environmental 
activities, thereby affecting negatively the demand faced by the duopoly. This 
effect generates incentives for firms to adopt the clean technology even in the 
absence of emissions taxes. When such taxes are considered, our results indicate 
that the benefit of adopting the clean technology is initially increasing and then 
decreasing in the emission tax. The range of values for which the emission tax 
increases this benefit becomes narrower when the consumers‟ environmental 
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1   Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed an increased awareness for issues pertaining to the impact of 
economic activity on environmental degradation. As a result, both policy makers and the 
wider public have intensified their efforts and actions towards pollution reduction. On the 
one hand, policy makers have attempted to encourage firms‟ investments in environmental 
R&D using a variety of instruments such as taxes on emissions, caps or R&D subsidies. On 
the  other  hand,  environmentally  conscious  consumers  have  not  only  shifted  their 
preferences  towards  goods  with  environmentally  friendly  attributes  (e.g.,  recyclable 
packaging, organic produce, certification of environmentally friendly production techniques 
etc.) but they have also increased the resources they devote to general activities that mitigate 
the extent of environmental degradation.  
     There are many ways through which consumers can contribute resources to improve the 
environment. One example is the participation in carbon offsetting schemes. These schemes 
are supported by firms in a variety of industries, from aviation (British Airways, for example) 
to energy generation (Eon). Through these schemes, individuals contribute financially to the 
purchase of carbon credits to compensate for their own emissions. Another example is the 
individuals‟  donations  to  certain  NGOs  who  purchase  permits  from  emissions  trading 
systems on their behalf, thereby reducing the amount of available permits and therefore 
effective emissions. Examples of such NGOs are the Acid Retirement Fund and the Clean 
Air Conservancy Trust in the US or Sandbag in the UK.  Finally, individuals can take part in 
environmental volunteering, which often involves not only the supply of unpaid work (with 
its associated opportunity cost) but an additional financial contribution.
1 
     So  far,  the  literature  has  contemplated  the  existence  of  environmentally  conscious 
consumers in models of product differenti ation, where  consumers‟  preferences  for  the 
environment  motivate  competing  firms  to  choose  the  environmental  attributes  of  their 
products (e.g., Bansal and Gangopadhyay 2003; Conrad 2005; Deltas et al. 2008; Andre et al. 
2009).
2 However, such frameworks fail to capture the essential features of the arrangements 
                                                 
1 For example, Global Vision International is an organisation which runs a number of projects related to 
climate change and conservation all over the world. Volunteers pay a financial contribution and work on their 
chosen project for a certain amount of time. 
2 These papers analyse the scope for public intervention even in the presence of environmentally conscious 
consumers  in  the  context  of  horizontal  differentiation  (Conrad  2005);  vertical  differentiation  (Bansal  and   3 
we  described earlier  (carbon-offsetting  programmes,  donations  to  charities,  volunteering, 
etc.).  In  this  type  of  arrangements,  consumers  effectively  internalise  (part  of)  the 
environmental  damage  and  spend  some  of  their  resources  to  general  environmentally 
friendly activities. The reason why the formal analysis of these issues is important is because 
by spending more on environmentally friendly activities, consumer resources are directed 
away from the consumption of goods produced by  all competing firms. Thus, this may 
generate an aggregate demand effect which affects negatively the demand faced by all firms 
(rather than a shift in the relative demand between different goods as in models of vertical 
and horizontal differentiation). This different type of environmental consciousness therefore 
calls for an alternative frame of analysis in order to study its effects on firms‟ behaviour and 
its implications for environmental policy.          
     In this paper, our aim is to fill the current void in the literature. We begin our analysis 
with the description of a market where consumers have preferences over the consumption 
of  a  homogeneous  good  and  environmental  quality.  These  consumers  can  also  devote 
resources towards environmental improvements. We show that, in response to an increase in 
pollution, consumers shift their resources away from the consumption of goods and towards 
activities that mitigate the extent of environmental degradation. Subsequently, we analyse a 
Cournot duopoly in which this negative demand effect impinges on both firms‟ decisions 
concerning output production  and the  cleanliness of the  technologies they  employ.  The 
latter is characterised by the pollutants emitted per unit of production and its choice may 
entail positive technology spillovers across firms.
3 In this context, we derive and discuss the 
implications  of  the  negative  demand  effect  of  pollution  for  firms‟  optimal  choices. 
Furthermore,  we  show  how  the  relative  strength  of  this  effect  may  impinge  on  the 
effectiveness of emission taxes as policy tools designed to motivate the adoption of cleaner 
production techniques by firms.
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Gangopadhyay  2003;  Andre  et  al.  2009);  and  where  two  dimensions  of  differentiation,  environmental  and 
intrinsic characteristics of the goods, are considered (Deltas et al. 2008).  
3  There is substantial evidence on the extent technological spillovers across firms and/or industries. See  
Griliches (1992), Buonanno et al. (2001) and Clarke et al. (2006). 
4 In addition to the more main stream instruments of environmental policy (i.e., emission taxes; subsidies to 
environmental innovation) the use of informational campaigns to raise environmental awareness as a policy 
instrument has become the focus of a number of studies (see  Petrakis  et  al.  2005;  Garcia-Gallego  and 
Georgantzis 2009, 2011). Our decision to focus on emission taxes lies on the importance of (environmental) 
technology choice in our setting.       4 
     The remaining of the paper is structures as follows. In Section 2, we analyse a market in 
which  environmentally  conscious  consumers  devote  resources  towards  environmental 
improvements and derive the implications of higher pollution for consumer demand. In 
Section  3,  we  use  these  implications  in  a  Cournot  duopoly  model  with  endogenous 
technology choice and derive equilibria in both the absence and the presence of emission 
taxes. Section 4 shows how the negative demand effect from pollution affects the scope of 
emission taxes as incentive mechanisms for the adoption of cleaner production methods. 
Section 5 concludes.              
                                
2   A Market with Environmentally Conscious Consumers  
Consider a market which consists of a unit mass of identical consumers and  N  firms that 
produce and sell quantities of a homogeneous product. The price of this product is denoted 
P . Each consumer  [0,1] i  is endowed with an (exogenous) income of  0 i y  and her 
preferences are defined over the consumption of the homogeneous good, denoted  i C , and 
her environmental concerns, captured by the variable  i E , according to 
  ln( ) (1 )ln( ) i i i u δ C δ E ,  (1) 
where  (0,1) δ  weights the two arguments of the consumer‟s utility.   
     We  shall  elaborate  on  the  consumers‟  preferences  over  the  natural  environment  by 
assuming that these are composed of two components. Firstly, we incorporate the amenity 
value of improved environmental quality (common to all consumers) by postulating that 
pollution – a by-product of firms‟ production activities – entails a utility cost for consumers. 
Secondly, we assume that each consumer is environmentally active in the sense that she is 
willing to devote resources to pro-environmental activities. Formally, we capture these two 
effects by assuming that  
  () ii E e M x ,  (2) 
where  i x   denotes  the  amount  of  a consumer‟s  endowment  devoted  to environmentally 
friendly activities,  M  denotes pollution or total emissions, while the function  () eM satisfies 
( ) 0 eM .
5 
                                                 
5 Effectively, we introduce a „joy-of-giving‟ (or „warm glow‟) argument to provide consumers with the motive to 
spend on environmentally friendly activities. Since the seminal work by Andreoni (1989, 1990) there has been   5 
     Each consumer‟s problem is to choose  i C  and  i x  to maximise the utility function in (1) 
subject to (2) and her budget constraint  
  i i i PC x y .  (3) 
Naturally,  when  maximising  her  utility,  the  consumer  takes  P ,  M ,  and  her  exogenous 
income  i y  as given.  
     Assuming interior solutions, we can reformulate the problem by substituting (2) and (3) 
in (1) to write  
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.  (7) 
Therefore, we can obtain 
*
i x  by setting  /0 ii Ux  in (6). It is straightforward to establish 
that  
 
* (1 ) ( ) ii x δ y δe M ,  (8) 
where  we  assume  that  the  consumer‟s  endowment  is  sufficiently  high  to  guarantee  that 







.  (9) 
     Recall that consumers in the market are assumed to be identical – an assumption that 
applies to both their preferences and their endowments. Thus, we have    i y y i  and we 
                                                                                                                                                 
ample experimental evidence of this behaviour in public good games (see for example, Palfrey and Prisbey 
1996, 1997; and Goeree et al. 2002). However, note that we can reformulate the problem to assume that 
consumers internalise the beneficial effects of their own actions for overall environmental quality, without 
causing any change to the qualitative characteristics of our subsequent results.       6 
can use (9) to obtain the aggregate demand function for the homogeneous consumption 







C C di δ
P
.  (10) 
Equation (10) reveals a standard, negatively sloped demand function with respect to the 
price  (i.e., 
* /0 CP).  Interestingly,  equation  (10)  also  implies  that  pollution  affects 
aggregate demand. The next proposition formalises this claim.  
 
Proposition 1. An increase in pollution will result, ceteris paribus, in a reduction of the consumption 
good’s aggregate demand. 
 
Proof. Using equation (10), we can see that 
*1 / ( ) 0 C M P e M .   QED 
 
     The intuition for this result is straightforward. The increase in pollution will stimulate the 
consumers‟ desire to devote resources towards environmentally oriented activities – an effect 
that is manifested in the increase of the marginal utility from such activities (see equation 6). 
The equilibrium can only be restored if this marginal utility falls back to its original level; 
thus, each consumer will optimally choose to increase her spending on  i x . However, with a 
given  amount  of  income  available,  this  shift  has  to  materialise  at  t he  expense  of 
consumption. Hence, the demand for the consumption good will ultimately decline as, for a 
given price level, the demand curve shifts downwards (see Figure 1).
6 
                                                 
6 The assumption of a unit substitution elasticity between  i C  and  i E  is innocuous for our results. We can derive 
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     The preceding analysis has demonstrated a link between aggregate demand and pollution 
in  an  economy  with  environmentally  conscious  consumers.  More  importantly,  the 
mechanism we have described implies that this link may be pertinent to various aspects of a 
firm‟s decision making process. To see this, recall that pollution is a negative side-effect of 
firms‟ production activities. Now, let us assume that each firm  1,..., jN  produces and 
supplies a quantity  j q  by accessing a technology that emits  j μ  units of pollutants per unit of 






M μq .  (11) 
     The expression in (11), combined with the demand function in (10), reveals how and why 
the mechanism summarised in Proposition 1 can be a crucial characteristic of firms‟ choices 
concerning  production,  technology  adoption  etc.  As  such,  it  may  have  significant 
implications for policies designed to induce the implementation of environmentally friendlier 
production methods by firms. Our purpose is to utilise the main point from the preceding 
discussion in order to provide a formal analysis of these implications. This is a task we 
undertake in the following sections of the paper.      
 
P 0
* C  
P
* ( , )
AA C c P M
* ( , )
BB C c P M
BA MM  8 
3   Emission Taxes and Environmental Technology Choice  
The  preceding  analysis  has  demonstrated  a  scenario  that  supports  an  aggregate  demand 
function 
* ( , ) C c P M , where  ,0 PM cc . Now, let us consider an industry whose firms face 
such  a  demand  function.  When  doing  so,  we  shall  restrict  our  attention  to  a  duopoly, 











( , ) j
j
q c P M .  (12) 
      Our demand equation in (12) has the same qualitative properties as (10), that is, it is 
decreasing in the price (P ) and the level of pollution (M ). To simplify matters, we shall 
follow  the  standard  approach  of  working  under  a  linear  approximation  of  an  aggregate 
demand  function  that  possesses  the  same  qualitative  properties.  Hence,  the  remaining 
analysis will be making use of 
  ( , ) Γ( ) ,    0 c P M a M P a ,       (13) 
where  Γ ( ) 0 M . A linear approximation is also employed to capture the negative effect of 
pollution on the demand for the good. That is 
  Γ( ) M γM ,  (14) 
where  0 γ  quantifies the relative strength of this negative effect. 
     Since firms produce a homogeneous product, it is helpful to think of them as operating 
under Cournot competition. Therefore, our formal analysis will be undertaken on the basis 






P α γμ q .  (15) 
     Each firm faces a constant marginal cost of production  0 m . Furthermore, it may be 
liable to a penalty (or tax) of  0 τ  per unit of emissions. Given that a firm emits  jj μq units 
of pollution, its variable costs are  
  () jj m τμ q .  (16) 




(1 ) ( ) j j j j j j
j
v α γμ q q m τμ q .  (17) 
 
Firms  can  choose  the  type  of  technology  they  employ  to  manufacture  their  goods.  In 
particular, we assume that each firm can choose between two alternative technologies („dirty‟ 
or „clean‟) which differ in their associated emissions per unit of output and adoption costs – 
the latter assumed to be fixed. We consider that there is a trade-off between the level of 
emissions  and  the  adoption  cost.  That  is,  the  dirty  technology  entails  an  emission  rate 
j μμ  and can be adopted at zero cost while the clean technology is associated with a lower 
emission rate  j μ μ μ  but a higher adoption cost. In what follows, we shall be assuming 
that  2 μμ
 
holds. This restriction is sufficient, albeit not necessary, to ensure the stability 
of the equilibrium that we will derive after solving the system of best response functions 
later in our analysis.
7  
     We also introduce the possibility of  positive spillovers associated with the design and 
implementation of the cleaner production method. Tha t is,  it is less costly for a firm  to 
develop and adopt the clean technology if its competitor is also using this clean technology. 
Formally, firms face a fixed cost Φ j such that 
 
0  if =  
Φ if ,  = ,
  if ,  =  
j
j j j j
j j j
μμ
φ μ μ μ μ
φ μ μ μ μ
.  (18) 
where φφ .      




(1 ) ( ) Φ j j j j j j j
j
π α γμ q q m τμ q .  (19) 
                                                 
7 Notice that this notion of stability differs from the one applied to variables that display an explicit dynamic 
pattern. In this case, an equilibrium is said to be stable if, starting from any point in its neighbourhood, the 
adjustment process in which players take turns myopically playing a best response to each other‟s current 




j j j j
ππ
q q q
, where  {1,2} j . See Martin (2001).     10 
The objective of the firm is to maximise profits by the appropriate choices of  j q  and  j μ . 
We assume that firms will choose their technologies first. Once firms‟ technology choices 
are observed, firms choose their output levels. Thus, the game has two stages: during the 
first stage, firms choose their technologies whereas during the second stage firms choose 
their output levels. We assume that firms choose simultaneously in each of these stages. As 
usual,  we  solve  this  game  by  backwards  induction  and  use  subgame  perfection  as  our 
equilibrium concept. 
 
3.1   The Second Stage: Output Choices  
In this stage, firms set their output levels to maximise profits. The first order condition for 




(1 ) (1 ) 0
j
j j j j j
j j
π
α γμ q q γμ m τμ
q
.  (20) 
Notice  that  the  second  order  condition  for  a  maximum  is  fulfilled 
22 ( / 2(1 ) 0) j j j π q γμ . Thus, we can solve (19) for  j q  to obtain the best response 
function for each firm, which is  
 
* [ (1 )]
2(1 )






.  (21) 
As expected, firms‟ outputs are strategic substitutes since 
* /0 j j j qq . An increase in the 
competitor‟s output will put a downward pressure on the good‟s price, thus reducing the 
firm‟s marginal revenue. Given that the marginal cost of production is unchanged, the firm 
will find it profitable to reduce its production in order to restore the marginal revenue back 
to its original level. It is worth noting that the magnitude of this effect is reinforced by the 
presence of the parameter γ . The intuition for this is that firm  j s output adds to the total 
level of emissions, triggering a shift of the consumers‟ demand away from the good and, as a 
response, a lower level of output by firm  j . The same intuitive mechanism more or less 
applies when we try to explain the inverse relation between the firm‟s production and its 
own emission rate. Notice, however, that this adverse effect is reinforced by the presence of 
the emission tax which, effectively, adds to the cost of production.    11 
     Solving the system of best response functions for  {1,2} j , we find the equilibrium 





















.  (23) 
Given these results, we are now able to formalise our analysis on the equilibrium output 
responses,  associated  with  different  technology  choices.  The  following  proposition 
summarises the corresponding qualitative effects.  
 
Proposition 2. A firm’s optimal production is, ceteris paribus, decreasing in its own emission rate but 
increasing in its competitor’s emission rate. The effect of the competitor’s technology choice (i.e., the competitor’s 
emission rate) on the firm’s output exists if and only if  0 τ . 
 
Proof.  Using  equations  (21)  and  (22),  it  is  straightforward  to  establish  that 
1 1 2 2 / , / 0  0 q μ q μ τ  and  1 2 2 1 / , / 0  q μ q μ iff  0 τ .   □  
 
     A few points merit discussion here. On the one hand, the firm‟s own emission rate has a 
negative effect on its own output through two different mechanisms. First, a higher emission 
rate means more pollution and therefore a higher shift in demand, leading to a reduction in 
output. Second, the own emission rate will positively affect the effective marginal cost of 
production of firms as long as emissions are taxed ( 0 τ ). The higher this cost, the lower 
the output will be. The competitor‟s emission rate will affect positively the firm‟s own output 
as long as emissions are taxed. Although this result may seem at odds with the effects we 
discussed earlier, it can be explained as follows. When a competitor chooses a more polluting 
technology, there are two conflicting effects on the firm‟s output. The direct effect is the one 
we  alluded  to  earlier  during  the  discussion  of  the  characteristics  of  the  best  response 
function – an effect which is negative. There is an indirect effect, however, which works in 
exactly the opposite direction. In particular, the competitor will combine her choice of a 
higher  emission  rate  with  a  lower  level  of  output  –  an effect  partially attributed  to  the   12 
presence of the parameter γ , but also amplified by the fact that the emission tax exacerbates 
the overall cost of production. It is this latter effect that renders the indirect impact to the 
competitor‟s output dominant and, given that output levels are strategic substitutes, makes it 
profitable for the firm to increase its output. Moreover, this is precisely why taxation is 
crucial for the materialisation of technology choice interactions when firms determine their 
output levels.   

























.  (25) 
These expressions, together with (22) and (23), reveal that, in terms of equilibrium output 
and, therefore, variable profits, the choice of technology across firms is subject to strategic 
substitutability: other things being equal, a firm‟s choice to implement a cleaner technology 
reduces  the  other  firm‟s  variable  profits,  thus  leaving  fewer  resources  available  for  the 
implementation of the cleaner technology. Nevertheless, the technology choice entails fixed 
costs whose presence introduces a strategic complementarity according to (18): other things 
being equal, a firm‟s decision to implement a less polluting technology makes it less costly 
for the other firm to do the same because of the positive spillover effect.  
     Given  that  the  profits  of  each  firm  depend  on  their  own  and  their  competitor‟s 
technology  choices,  four  scenarios  arise:  one  where  both  firms  choose  the  cleaner 
technology, ( , ) μμ; another where both firms choose the dirtier technology, ( , ) μμ; and two 
asymmetric ones, where firm 1 chooses the clean technology and firm 2 the dirty one, ( , ) μμ
,  as  well  as the  opposite  case where  ( , ) μμ. Thus,  the variable  profits in  each  of  these 




















,  (27)   13 
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,  (28) 
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.  (29) 
 
Note that in the above equations, we use the first superscript to identify firm  j ‟s own 
technology choice and the second superscript to identify its competitor‟s technology choice. 
Bringing  together  equations  (26)  to  (29)  and  equation  (18),  we  complete  the  matrix  of 
payoffs in Table 1. In the next section we will identify under which conditions each of the 
above mentioned four scenarios may arise as equilibrium outcomes.  
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Table 1. Payoff matrix 
     
3.2   The First Stage: Technology Choices  
In this stage, firms seek to maximise profits through the appropriate choice of technology. 
Our  preceding  analysis  indicates  that  firms  have  an  incentive  to  implement  a  cleaner 
technology even in the absence of taxation due to the effect of pollution on the aggregate 
demand of environmentally conscious consumers, captured by the parameter  γ . We will 
start by analysing the case without environmental policy ( 0 τ ).  
 
3.2.1   Technology Choice without Emission Taxes 























.  (31) 
     These equations reveal that the choice of a cleaner technology (i.e.,  μ  as opposed to  μ ) 
will be optimal if and only if pollution entails the type of aggregate demand effects that we 
identified in Section 2. If  0 γ , and in the absence of environmental taxes, there is no 
incentive by neither firm to incur a cost for an activity that has no benefit whatsoever. 
However, insofar as  0 γ , such benefit clearly exists: a firm may be willing to incur the 
fixed cost of environmental innovation, anticipating that this will induce environmentally 
conscious consumers to shift their resources towards the consumption of goods. In fact, 
such motive exists even in the absence of spillovers. Nevertheless, if spillovers exist, they 
will create a further incentive for firms to adopt the cleaner technology.  
     Let us discuss now the conditions under which each combination of strategies may arise 
as an equilibrium. Note that here, the variable profit is solely a function of the own emission 
rate. Thus, the net benefit in terms of variable profits of implementing a cleaner technology 
is the same irrespectively of the competitors‟ choice, since 
, , , , μ μ μ μ μ μ μμ
j j j j v v v v . In fact, in 
both cases this difference yields 
 





.  (32) 
It is evident from (32) that, in the absence of emission taxes, a benefit exists if and only if 
0 γ  – that is, only if pollution results in aggregate demand effects. Next, we need to 
compare this net benefit with the difference in fixed cost of adopting each technology.
8 The 
result of this comparison will determine the equilibrium of the game. The results of this 
comparison are presented in the next proposition.  
 
Proposition 3. Suppose that  0 τ . Then the following are equilibria: 
i.  ( , ) μμ if ωφ ; 
                                                 
8 As a tiebreaking rule, we assume that if a firm is indifferent between the two technologies, it will choose  μ .   15 
ii.  ( , ) μμ and ( , ) μμ if φ ω φ ; 
iii.  ( , ) μμ if ωφ . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
      
     Proposition 3 states that the only equilibria that arise are symmetric (either both firms 
choose the clean technology or both firms choose the dirty one). In particular, when the net 
benefit of choosing the clean technology is very small (too small to be profitable to adopt it 
even when there are spillovers), the only equilibrium is ( , ) μμ. Conversely, when this benefit 
is very high (high enough to make adoption profitable even without spillovers), the only 
equilibrium is ( , ) μμ. For intermediate levels, both ( , ) μμ and ( , ) μμ
 
arise as equilibria since 
adopting the clean technology is only profitable if the competitor adopts it too; that is when 
there is a possibility of benefiting from spillovers. In this case, however, this outcome is not 
guaranteed as firms face a coordination problem due to the multiplicity of equilibria.
9 For 
values  satisfying  ( , ] ω φ φ   although  the  positive  spillovers  would  make  it  mutually 
advantageous  for  both  firms  to  choose  the  clean  technology,  the  expectation  that  the 
competitor may not choose  μ  (hence, eliminating the benefits emanating from the spillover 
effect) may discourage firms from a choice of  μ .      
     In the next section, we analyse the first stage in the presence of emission taxes and try to 
identify the equilibrium outcomes that transpire in this scenario.       
 
3.2.2   Technology Choice in the Presence of Emission Taxes 
For subsequent purposes, we begin this part by defining  
 
2 2
, , [ (2 )] ()
9(1 ) 9(1 )
μμ μμ
jj
amτ μ μ amτμ
ω v v
γμ γμ
,  (33) 
and  
                                                 
9 Effectively, the existence of spillovers introduces a strategic complementarity in the choice of technology. See 
Cooper and John (1988) for a detailed discussion on the implications of coordination failures in models with 
strategic complementarities.      16 
 
22
,, ( ) [ (2 )]
9(1 ) 9(1 )
μ μ μ μ
jj
amτμ a m τ μ μ
ω v v
γμ γμ
.  (34) 
The interpretation of (33) and (34) is similar to the corresponding one in equation (32). 
Here, however, the increase in variable profits from implementing the cleaner technology 
depends on whether the competitor chooses the dirty or the clean technology. We label with 
ω  this increase in the latter case and with ω  in the former. If ω  is higher than φ , a firm‟s 
best  response  to  its  competitor  choosing  the  dirty  technology  is  to  adopt  the  clean 
technology. Analogously, if ω  is higher than φ , its best response to the clean technology is 
to adopt the clean technology too. Some tedious, but straightforward, algebra reveals that 
ωω   holds.  In  other  words,  the  net  benefit  from  implementing  the  less  polluting 
technology  is  higher  when  the  competitor  actually  implements  the  more  polluting  one. 
Recalling that the presence of the emission tax introduces some strategic substitutability in 
the optimal choice of technology (as opposed to the strategic complementarity emerging 
from the presence of spillover effects), the intuition behind this result is clear: when the 
competitor chooses the cleaner technology, and as long as the government taxes emissions, 
it becomes more competitive in the product market, as its marginal cost is lower than it 
would be if it chose the dirty technology. In turn, this affects negatively firm  j ‟s output and 
therefore the (variable) profitability of adopting the cleaner technology.        
     With these in mind, we can use the two propositions that follow in order to summarise 
the equilibrium outcomes that materialise during the first stage of the competition (when 
0 τ ).  
 
Proposition 4. Suppose that  0 τ and ω ω φ φ . Then, the following are equilibria: 
i.  ( , ) μμ if 0 ω φ ω φ ; 
ii.  ( , ) μμ and ( , ) μμ if  0 ω φ ω φ ; 
iii.  ( , ) μμ if  0 ω φ ω φ . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
  
Proposition 5. Suppose that  0 τ and ω ω φ φ . Then, the following are equilibria:   17 
 
i.  ( , ) μμ if 0 ω φ ω φ ; 
ii.  ( , ) μμ and ( , ) μμ if  0 ω φ ω φ; 
iii.  ( , ) μμ if  0 ω φ ω φ . 
 
Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
 
     The scenarios described in Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 differ with respect to the 
relative strength of the spillover effect φφ  which is larger in the scenario in Proposition 4. 
Nevertheless, there are some common outcomes in both scenarios. Particularly, when the 
net benefit of choosing the clean technology is very small or very high, the equilibria are 
analogous to the equilibria arising in the absence of taxes; that is, ( , ) μμ in the former case 
and ( , ) μμ in the latter.  
     However,  a  major  difference  across  scenarios  arises  for  intermediate  values  of  this 
benefit. In the first scenario, the relatively strong spillovers make the adoption of the clean 
technology profitable if and only if the competitor adopts it too. If the competitor uses the 
dirty technology, the benefit in terms of variable profits is not enough to make the adoption 
of the clean technology profitable. This is reflected in the equilibrium outcomes described in 
Proposition 4 (ii); in such a case, both ( , ) μμand ( , ) μμ are Nash equilibria. However, when 
the  spillover  effect  is  not  so  strong,  it  may  be  profitable  for  a  firm  to  adopt  the  clean 
technology as a reply to the competitor‟s adopting the dirty technology. In such a case, the 
competitor is in disadvantage in the output market due to the higher marginal cost.  For the 
same reason, it is optimal for the competitor to adopt the dirty technology as a reply to the 
clean technology, as its less competitive position in the market and therefore lower output 
makes it less profitable to incur in the higher fixed costs of the clean technology. Thus, two 
asymmetric equilibria arise,  ( , ) μμ and  ( , ) μμ, as Proposition 5 (ii) shows. Consequently, 
firms face a coordination problem due to the multiplicity of equilibria in both scenarios for 
intermediate values of the benefit of adopting the clean technology.   
                                        18 
4   Environmental Policy and Incentives for Pro-Environment 
Innovation 
In this section, our purpose is to examine the effectiveness of environmental policy on 
increasing the incentive of firms in adopting the less polluting production method. Our 
previous analysis has made clear that the emission tax τ  will affect this incentive through its 
impact on variable profits. In particular, it will do so through the effect it has on the net 
benefit of introducing the cleaner technology.  That is, the increase in variable profits when a 
firm shifts from the dirty (i.e.,  μ ) to the clean technology (i.e.,  μ ).  
     The previous section has revealed that the increment in variable profits from introducing 
a cleaner technology varies depending on whether the competitor chooses to innovate (ω ) 
or not (ω ). We also know that the higher  ω  and  ω  are, the more likely that a firm will 
choose to adopt the clean technology as a reply to its competitor respectively adopting the 
clean technology or the dirty technology. Here we will use comparative statics to check 
whether τ  has a positive, negative or non-monotonic effect on ω  and ω . This will allow us 
to establish whether emissions taxation makes the adoption of the clean technology more 
likely  to  happen  in  equilibrium.  To  this  aim,  we  shall  examine  ω   and  ω   separately, 
beginning with the former.  
     As it is evident from our previous analysis and discussion, we are interested on the effect 
of τ  on the composite term  ω  in (34). Prior to undertaking the formal analysis, however, 
we need to impose an upper bound on the emission tax. This is necessary to ensure that 
variable profits are non-negative under any possible scenario concerning technology choice 
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following proposition summarises our result. 
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Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
 
     One implication of Proposition 6 is that there is a tax rate that maximises the incentive to 
adopt a clean technology when the competitor is expected to act similarly. Additionally, we 
can see that when the negative aggregate demand effect from pollution is more pronounced 
(i.e., when γ  is higher) then the tax rate that maximises the incentive for pro-environment 
R&D becomes lower.  
     In  terms  of  intuition,  the  non-monotonic  effect  of  the  emission  tax  is  due  to  the 
conflicting effects on variable profits. On the one hand, the emission tax motivates the firm 
to choose a cleaner technology in order to reduce its overall tax obligation. On the other 
hand,  however,  excessively  high  taxation  makes  the  overall  tax  burden  so high  and  the 
reduction in variable profits so strong, that it eliminates any incentive for the adoption of the 
cleaner technology. Naturally, the tax rate where these marginal benefits and costs are equal, 
is the one that will provide the highest incentive for pro-environment innovation.  
     An important element in our analysis comes from the impact of the negative demand 
effect of pollution, as this is captured by the parameter  γ . Given that this effect already 
provides an incentive for the adoption of a cleaner production method (see Section 3.2.1), 
the parameter  γ  exemplifies the distortive nature  of the emission tax, meaning that the 
scope  for  environmental  policy  to  increase  the  incentive  for  environmental  innovation 
becomes limited for higher values of γ . Consequently, it is possible that the same increase in 
taxation that would raise the incentive for the adoption of the cleaner technology when 
0 γ , may actually decrease this incentive for  0 γ . In terms of Figure 2, this scenario is 
depicted for values of the emission tax that lie on the interval 
**
00 ( , ) γγ ττ .  
     Next, we undertake a similar analysis for the case where the firm expects its competitor 
not to adopt the cleaner production technique – that is, we focus on the composite term ω    20 
in (33). In order to ensure that variable profits remain non-negative in this case, we use 
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Proof. See the Appendix.   □    
 
     As  we  can  see,  the  possibility  of  non-monotonic  effects  from  environmental  policy 
emerges in this scenario as well – as does the impact of the preference parameter γ  on the 
tax rate that maximises the incentive to use the clean technology. Consequently, the intuition 
for these results is exactly the same with the one discussed in the analysis of Proposition 6. 
Given that both ω  and  ω  are inverted U-shapes in τ , it is clear that the likelihood that a 
firm adopts the clean technology in equilibrium is initially increasing in the tax rate but will 
eventually turn decreasing. The turning point will take place earlier, i.e. for a lower level of 
the tax rate, if consumers have some preference for the environment which makes them 
shift resources from consumption to environmental activities, as illustrated in Figure 2. 
     Before  concluding  this  section,  it  is  worth  discussing  the  role  of  the  tax  rate  in 
determining which combination of strategies arises in equilibrium. Thus, we need to consider 
jointly the effects that τ  has on both ω and ω . Figure 3 provides an illustration of ω and ω  
for arbitrary levels of fixed costs and spillovers. One can see that five regions emerge with 
lead to different equilibrium outcomes. In the first region (between 0 and  1 τ ), the best reply 
to both  μ  and  μ  is  μ . This implies that the arising equilibrium will be ( μ , μ ). If the tax 
rate is set at a higher level (in the region between  1 τ  and  2 τ ), the best response to  μ  is  μ    21 
and to  μ  is  μ . Thus, it may occur that either (μ , μ ) or ( μ , μ ) arise in equilibrium. In 
contrast, if the tax rate was set in the third region (between  2 τ  and  3 τ ), the only equilibrium 
would be ( μ , μ ), as  μ  is the best reply to both  μ  and  μ . Increasing the tax even further to 
be in the fourth region (between  3 τ  and  4 τ ) reduces the profitability of adopting the clean 
technology and may induce  asymmetric equilibria where only one of the firms adopts the 
clean technology, that is (μ , μ ) or ( μ , μ ), since the best reply to  μ  is  μ  and vice versa. 
Increasing the tax rate even further (to be higher than  4 τ ) will lead to an equilibrium where 
the two firms adopt the polluting technology (μ , μ ). Thus, setting the tax rate to be in the 
intermediate region (between  2 τ  and  3 τ ) would be the only way in which the policy maker 
can warrant an outcome where both firms adopt the clean technology in equilibrium.
10 
     Some important implications for policy making can be drawn from the above results. The 
first and perhaps counterintuitive implication is that increasing the tax rate on emissions 
does not necessarily create further incentives for the adoption of clean technologies. In fact, 
a higher tax rate may actually reduce the incentives to adopt the c lean technology and 
therefore reduce the likelihood of this adoption in equilibrium, particularly if the original tax 
rate on emission is already relatively high. Secondly, the policy maker should be particularly 
weary of such an effect in situations where consumers are environmentally conscious as in 
such  situations,  the  benefit  of  adopting  the  clean  technology  turns  decreasing  in  the 
emissions tax rate for lower levels of taxation. Thus, the policy maker should take into 
account the behaviour of consumers when designing its environmental policy. For example, 
if carbon offsetting schemes are introduced in a given industry and consumers are actively 
participating in them, it may be optimal for the government to reduce its level of emissions 
taxation in that industry, especially if this level is initially high; otherwise, the incentives of 
firms in that given industry to adopt clean methods of production may be damaged.  
 
                                                 
10 Note that Figure 3 is presented as an illustrative example only. We could in fact find that the second and the 
fourth  regions  are  switched  over,  or  even  that  they  do  not  arise.  This  would  depend  on  the  specific 
combination of parameters in each case. What is generally true is that as τ  increases, there is a transition from 
less adoption of clean technologies to more adoption of clean technologies and then again to less adoption of 
clean technologies.   22 
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4   Conclusions 
We have analysed how the existence of environmentally conscious consumers affects firms‟ 
adoption of cleaner manufacturing technologies. Although, in recent years the literature has 
introduced  the  presence  of  environmentally  conscious  consumers  in  models  of  product 
differentiation, such models are not suitable for the analysis of situations where consumers 
are involved in environmental activities such as participation in carbon offsetting schemes, 
environmental volunteering, donations etc.  
     In  this  paper  we  propose  a  framework  of  analysis  for  this  alternative  type  of 
environmental conscious consumers. In particular, we have assumed that consumers‟ utility 
is a function of both their level of consumption of a good, the quality of the environment 
and the warm glow derived from taking part in the environmental activities. As for the 
technology choice, we have assumed that firms have two technologies at their disposal which 
differ in their associated emissions per unit of output ratio and fixed costs.  
     We have shown that following an increase in pollution, consumers will channel resources 
away from the consumption to environmental activities, thereby reducing the demand for 
the  good  which  firms  face  and  the  subsequent  levels  of  output  produced  by  firms  in 
equilibrium.  This  reduction  in  demand  due  to  consumers‟  environmental  conscience 
generates  incentives  for  firms  to  adopt  the  clean  technology  even  in  the  absence  of 
emissions taxes or technology spillovers.  
     Our results also indicate that increasing the tax rate on emissions does not necessarily 
lead  to  the  adoption  of  clean  technologies.  In  fact,  the  benefit  of  adopting  the  clean 
technology follows an inverted U-shape in the tax rate, which implies that after a threshold 
value of the emission tax rate, further tax increases make less likely the adoption of the clean 
technology in equilibrium. This counterintuitive effect is more prevalent in situations where 
consumers are environmentally conscious.   
     Although our results have been derived in a streamlined duopolistic model, we conjecture 
that they will hold even under a more general setting due to the clear-cut manner of the 
mechanism that generates them; that is, the negative effect on the demand caused by shifting 
resources away from the consumption of the good. Consequently, the main policy lesson 
that can be extracted from our model is that any environmental policy aimed at improving 
the technological profile of firms should take into account the behaviour of environmentally 
conscious consumers where relevant (for example, in markets where environmental activities   24 
such as the ones described above take place); otherwise, the policy may have undesirable 
effects on firms‟ decisions to invest in cleaner technologies. 
 
Appendix 
Proof to Proposition 3 
From Table 1 and equation (32), we know that that firm 1‟s best response to firm 2 choosing 
μ  is  μ  ( μ ) if ω ( ) φ . Likewise, its best response to firm 2 choosing  μ  is  μ  ( μ ) if ω
( )  φ . Recall that  φφ . Thus, if  ωφ , firm 1 has a dominant strategy which is  μ . 
Moreover, if ωφ , its dominant strategy is  μ  instead. As the game is symmetric, the same 
applies to firm 2. Hence, ( , ) μμ and ( , ) μμ are the equilibria in dominant strategies if ωφ  
and ωφ  respectively.  
     Now assume that φ ω φ . In such a case, firm 1‟s best response to firm 2 choosing  μ  
is  μ  whereas its best response to firm 2‟s choice of  μ  is  μ . Again, due to symmetry, the 
same applies to firm 2. Thus, if  φ ω φ , two Nash equilibria arise:  ( , ) μμ and  ( , ) μμ. 
QED. 
 
Proof to Proposition 4 
Consider the scenario where  0 τ  and ω ω φ φ  or ω φ ω φ after rewriting. From 
Table 1 and equations (33) and (34) we know that that firm 1‟s best response to  μ  is  μ  () μ
if ωφ( ) 0 and to  μ  is  μ  () μ  ωφ ( ) 0. Due to symmetry, the same applies to 
firm 2. Given these conditions and ω ω φ φ , three cases may emerge:  
(i)  0 ωφ  and  0 ωφ ; 
(ii)  0 ωφ  and  0 ωφ ; 
(iii)  0 ωφ  and  0 ωφ . 
     In case (i) both firms have a dominant strategy in  μ  (it is their best response in both  μ  
and  μ ). Thus, ( , ) μμ is an equilibrium in dominant strategies. In case (iii) both firms have a 
dominant strategy in  μ  (it is their best response in both  μ  and  μ ). Therefore, ( , ) μμ is an   25 
equilibrium in dominant strategies.  In case (ii), firm 1‟s best response to  μ  is  μ   () μ if 
ωφ( ) 0 and to  μ  is  μ  () μ  ωφ ( ) 0. Of course, the same applies to firm 2 due 
to symmetry. Thus, two Nash equilibria emerge in this case; that is, ( , ) μμ and ( , ) μμ. 
     To  complete  the  proof,  note  that  the  conditions  in  (i),  (ii),  and  (iii)  can  be  written 
respectively  as  and  0 ω φ ω φ ,  0 ω φ ω φ   and  0 ω φ ω φ
 
since 
ω φ ω φ
 
applies in this scenario.   QED. 
   
Proof to Proposition 5 
Consider the scenario where  0 τ  and ω ω φ φ  or ω φ ω φ after rewriting. From 
Table 1 and equations (33) and (34) we know that that firm 1‟s best response to  μ  is  μ  ( μ ) 
if ωφ ( ) 0. Due to symmetry, the same applies to firm 2. Given these conditions and 
ω ω φ φ , three cases may emerge:  
(i)  0 ωφ  and  0 ωφ ; 
(ii)  0 ωφ  and  0 ωφ ; 
(iii)  0 ωφ  and  0 ωφ . 
     In case (i) both firms have a dominant strategy in  μ  (it is their best response in both  μ  
and  μ ). Thus, in this case ( , ) μμ is an equilibrium in dominant strategies. In case (iii) both 
firms have a dominant strategy in  μ  (it is their best response in both  μ  and  μ ). Therefore, 
( , ) μμ is an equilibrium in dominant strategies.  In case (ii), firm 1‟s best response to  μ  is  μ  
and its best response to  μ  is  μ . Of course, the same applies to firm 2 due to symmetry. 
Thus, two Nash equilibria emerge in this case; that is, ( , ) μμ and ( , ) μμ. 
     To  complete  the  proof,  note  that  the  conditions  in  (i),  (ii),  and  (iii)  can  be  written 
respectively  as  and  0 ω φ ω φ,  0 ω φ ω φ  and  0 ω φ ω φ
 
since 
ω φ ω φ
 
applies in this scenario.   QED. 
 
Proof to Proposition 6 
Using the expression in (34), we can calculate the first derivative as    26 
 
( ) [ (2 )](2 ) 2
9 (1 ) 9(1 )
amτμ μ a m τ μ μ μ μ ω
τ γμ γμ
.  (A1) 
Obviously, the sign of (A1) will be dictated by the sign of the expression incised brackets. 
After some tedious algebra, we can reduce this expression to   
  ( ) ( ){2( ) [ (4 )]} J τ μ μ a m τμ γμ a m τ μ μ .  (A2) 
We  can  use  (A2)  to  check  that  (0) ( )(2 )( ) 0 J μ μ γμ a m   and 
4 2
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2 2 2
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 . Now, we can use (A1) 
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To complete the proof, we use (A4) to calculate   
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QED. 
 
Proof to Proposition 7 
The expression in (33) allow us to derive  
 
[ (2 )](2 ) 2 ( )
9 (1 ) 9(1 )
amτ μ μ μ μ ω a m τμ μ
τ γμ γμ
.  (A6) 
The sign of (A6) depends on the sign of the expression incised brackets. This expression can 
be reduced to   
  ( ) ( ){2( ) [ (4 )]} J τ μ μ a m τμ γμ a m τ μ μ .  (A7)   27 
From  (A7)  we  can  see  that  (0) ( )(2 )( ) 0 J μ μ γμ a m   and 
( )( )(2 )(1 )
0
μ μ a m μ μ γμ am
J
μμ
 . Next, we compute the second derivative 
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To complete the proof, we use (A9) to calculate   
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